The Origins of the First World War: diplomatic and military documents, Manchester University Press, 2013 Find out more about this book I published my book Die Julikrise in 2014 to present my research-based counter-argument to the centenary revisionist interpretations. I argued that all the major powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France and Russia) had some responsibility for the escalation of the July Crisis but that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments deliberately provoked this crisis without flinching at the possibility of unleashing a major war. Die Julikrise has sold more than 6,000 copies and is also available in Danish and Turkish. Crucially, the book, and other publications in history journals and public forums, have given me a platform to engage in public debate.

Here Annika explains her research and why it’s essential to understand the origins of the war and the controversy the topic has sparked. The hundred-year debate The same is true, to some extent, of France's role. The decision-makers in Paris, Stefan Schmidt argued in 2009 in an in-depth study of French foreign policy before the war, were intent on strengthening the Franco-Russian Alliance and thus prepared to support Russia's policy in 1914, regardless of the consequences. He concludes that French President Raymond Poincaré did not, in his dealings with Russia, actively intend a military escalation of the July Crisis, but that his aim was to achieve a political victory for the Entente. Footnote 23 That said, Poincaré was prepared, in this pursuit, to risk war if Germany insisted on taking things further. On the eve of the centenary, it had thus become widely accepted that war had not been ruled out in principle by the governments in St. Petersburg and Paris, and that they were willing to seize a perceived golden opportunity to achieve, if possible, a diplomatic victory—while not ruling out going to war if the need arose.

Extract

Diplomatie und Kriegsausbruch', in Gerhard Hirschfeld et al (eds), Enzyclopädie Erster Weltkrieg, 2nd edn, Schöningh, Paderborn 2014, 1015-1020. For many Germans, this radical new interpretation ended a century of blame for the outbreak of World War I. As Michael Epkenhans observes, Clark's apparent exoneration of Germany's role in the origins of the war had “a near-magical effect on a large public [audience] and many German historians.” Footnote 43 Clark's book “buried six-feet deep the thesis of Germany's main responsibility,” one journalist commented approvingly. Footnote 44 In an early review of Clark's book in Der Spiegel, historian Holger Afflerbach summed up the emerging new consensus that “the Germans are guilty of [causing] the World War I—but not more so than others.” Footnote 45 The German public eagerly accepted this new interpretation, and many historians agreed. Footnote 46 Summing up the most recent developments in the field, Samuel R. Williamson identified an “erosion of the German [guilt] paradigm” in the historical literature. Footnote 47 We’ve just heard from John Röhl and now I’m in the studio here in London with Professor Christopher Clark from Cambridge who is equally as fascinated by this long debate on the origins of the First World War, but he takes rather a different angle in approaching the topic. Chris, before we talk about your own interpretation, I just wonder how convincing you find John’s view which I guess I’d summarise as the German paradigm.

RFE/RL: There has been a lot of speculation that the situation around the world now -- say, in Ukraine or the dispute between China and Japan over islands and resources in the South China Sea -- and the situation in the summer of 1914. Do you see parallels and lessons that can be applied to the world today? Well the most recent interpretations on the origins of the war focus on Russia and France in particular and also Serbia’s role has been highlighted – I’m thinking here of Christopher Clark’s book The Sleepwalkers, which has already made quite a splash and he’s looked at a lot of archival evidence to show for example Serbia’s involvement, to prove Serbia’s involvement in the assassination and to highlight the roles played by France and Russia; and Sean McMeekin is another example of somebody who highlights Russia’s culpability in the outbreak of the war. I wonder what your view is on the idea that Europe sleepwalked into war in 1914. That suggests to me that nobody actually wanted it and the war really was an accident. The Fischer Controversy, Documents and the “Truth” About the Origins of the First World War’, The Journal of Contemporary History April 2013 48 (2), pp. 290-314 More than 100 years after the First World War ended, we can still learn a great deal from its contested origins. The controversy teaches us that history is interpretation and that it reflects current political concerns. These interpretations can be influenced by governments and by the convictions of the historians whose research underpins them. Studying this debate makes us question what we read and learn about the past and shows us the importance of examining the evidence closely. As E.H. Carr put it, it also reminds us to know our historians– to understand the motivations of those who present the evidence to us. Fundamentally, it teaches us to be critical students of the past and critical citizens in the present. Gerhard Hirschfeld: I don't see parallels. History does not repeat itself. History is, in a way, dependent on certain factors and conditions that are different from what we used to have. There are no parallels between 1914 and 2014. Having said that, there is one element, however, that, I'm afraid, creates continuity and this is the human factor. People do not change. They have the same feelings, emotions, ambitions, strivings for power. So, when it comes to judging the personal factor, the ambitions of politicians, there I would say is an element of continuity. But the historical context changed dramatically. We didn't have a NATO in 1914, we didn't have an OSCE, an EU. We didn't have international organizations and alliances that are controlling elements of a crisis. You have the same emotions, but not the same conditions and historical structures as in the past.

I think it is wrong to talk about some sort of unique German war guilt, but we have to talk about different and very often interrelated responsibilities. The talk on German war guilt, which was very much influenced by the Versailles Treaty and the interwar period and the argument that Hitler's rise was only possible because of this war guilt.... Where is the debate headed? All too often historians have attempted to predict the future of this century-long controversy—and they have nearly always got it wrong, thus making it presumptuous to make confident predictions. Footnote 126 In a summary of the debate as it had developed up to the end of 2012, Gerhard Groß was confident that the topic would continue to exercise public opinion in the run-up to the centenary and provide for “an exciting discussion,” but he did not expect “a new Fischer-controversy with a great deal of public attention like the one in the 1960s.” As we have seen, that turned out to be far from the mark. Footnote 127